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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DANIEL J. NIXON,

]

Plaintiff and Appeallant,

]

vs.

])

Brief of Appellant

G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK, BUREAU
CHIEF, DRIVERS LICENSE DIVISION
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH,

])
]
]

Case No. 930549-CA

Defendants and Respondents.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Section 78-2a-3(b)(i) Utah Code Ann. confers jurisdiction on
the Utah Court of Appeal to decide "appeals from the district court
review

of

adjudicative

proceedings

of

agencies

of

political

subdivisions of the state or other local agencies[.]"

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether Plaintiff
review

in

the

is irrevocably foreclosed from 6e novo

District

Court

of

Driver

License

Division's

Administrative action to suspend his driver license if he did not
request a hearing before the driver license hearing officer.

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because this case presents a strictly legal issue the trial
court's statutory

interpretation

is accorded

appeal, but is reviewed for correctness.

no deference on

City of Monticello v.

Christensen. 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied. 489 U.S. 841
(1990); State v. Singh. 819 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah App. 1991).

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Section 41-6-44.10

Utah Code Ann., Section 53-3-224 Utah Code

Ann., Section 63-46b-14 Utah Code Ann., Section 63-46b-15 Utah Code
Ann., are determinative in this action.
There are no constitutional provisions determinative in this
action.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an Appeal from an Order of the Honorable Ray M.
Harding, Judge of the Fourth Judicial

District Court of Utah

County, State of Utah, dismissing the Plaintiff's petition for
review of Administrative action to suspend Plaintiff's driver
license.

The Order appealed from was entered on or about the 3rd

day of May, 1993.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Daniel J. Nixon was arrested on December 2, 1992 for Driving
Under the Influence of Alcohol, in violation of Section 41-6-44
Utah Code Ann.

At this time, Mr. Nixon was served with a notice

regarding the intent of Driver License Services to take action with
2

regard to his driving privilege.

(Exhibit A,)

Mr. Nixon did not

request a hearing pursuant to his opportunity to do so as outlined
in Exhibit A.

Instead, he relied on the warning near the bottom

of Exhibit A which states "FAILURE TO REQUEST A HEARING OR FAILURE
TO

APPEAR

FOR

privilege."

HEARING

may

result

in

loss

of

your

driving

Plaintiff further relied on Section 53-3-224 Utah Code

Ann. (1989) which states (1) "A person denied a license or whose
license has been cancelled, suspended, or revoked by the division
may seek judicial review of the division's order" and on the fact
that no statute or rule requires an individual to request a hearing
or suffer the

loss of his right to judicial

review

under the

statute cited above nor under Section 63-46b-15 Utah Code Ann.
(1989).
When

the

Driver

License

Department

suspended

Mr. Nixon's

driving privilege, he attempted to avail himself of his statutory
opportunity

for judicial

review of the division's order.

The

District Court denied his petition stating the Plaintiff was not
entitled to judicial review of the Driver License Division's Order
because "an individual is not entitled to judicial review of the
actions of administrative agencies unless and until the individual
has exhausted all administrative remedies."

The Court concluded

it was without jurisdiction and dismissed Plaintiff's case with
prejudice.

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The

plain

language

privileges clearly

of

the

statutes

governing

driving

indicates that any person who is denied a

license or whose license has been suspended, cancelled or revoked
by the Driver License Department may seek review by trial de novo
in the district court.

The district court erred when it denied

review because the Defendant/Appellant did not participate in the
optional Driver License Division hearing.

ARGUMENT
Defendant's participation at a Driver License Division hearing
to determine if an individual's driving privilege may be suspended
pursuant

to

allegations

of

permissive, not mandatory.

driving

under

the

influence

is

Because this is a case of first

impression, Plaintiff relies on analogous decisions to support his
argument.

In Heinecke v. Dept. of Commerce. 810 P.2d 459 (Utah

App. 1991), this court examined whether department review was a
mandatory

prerequisite

to

judicial

review

of

Division

Occupational and Professional Licensing (Division) action.

of
This

court said, "unlike statutory provisions governing the Public
Service Commission which reaui re parties to apply for review or
rehearing by the Public Service Commission before seeking judicial
review, (see Section 54-7-15 (1990) Utah Code Ann.), the appeals
procedure governing the Division is nothing more nor less than what
is specified in Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA)[.]M

This

court went on to say that no provision in the statutes governing
4

the Division appeared to provide for review beyond the Division
level as contemplated

in Section

12(1 )(a) of UAPA, nor is any

mandatory review provided for as contemplated

in section 12(3).

This court further commented that the usage of the words "permit"
and "may" indicate review is optional.
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Summary Affirmance relies
on State Tax Comm'n v. Iverson. 782 P.2d 519 (Utah 1989) and
S & G. Inc. v. Morgan. 797 P.2d 1085 (Utah 1990) (a state engineer
decision).

In a later note to the court, Defendant cites the case

of Maverik Country Stores v. Industrial Comm'n. 221 Utah Advanced
Reporter

17 (Utah Appellate

1993) filed September

7, 1993, as

further support of their position that Mr. Nixon's participation
in the DLS hearing was a mandatory prerequisite to cJe novo judicial
review. Considering the differences between these Commissions, the
State Engineer and the Driver License Division, it seems unlikely
that the holdings in these cases have direct application to the
Driver License Division.
License

Division

(DLS)

The policy issues which govern the Driver
are

more

analogous

to

Division

of

Occupational and Professional Licensing than it is to the State Tax
Commission or the State Industrial Commission.

The purpose of DLS

and the Division parallel in many ways: they both grant licenses
to individuals who have a measurable amount of knowledge in a given
area; with the license comes privileges and duties.

Licensing

serves to protect the public from harm resulting from action taken
by an individual who lacks a minimal amount of knowledge and from
harm resulting from action taken by an individual who acts contrary
5

to the duty he assumed when his privilege was granted.

When DLS

or the Division suspend or revoke an individual's license, the
purpose is to punish the individual for acting in a manner contrary
to the duty imposed by the agency and accepted by the individual
upon licensing of that individual.
The purpose of the State Tax Commission is to enforce the
state tax laws.

The purpose of the State Industrial Commission in

the case of Maverik Country Stores v. Industrial Comm'n, £d.is to
enforce the Anti-Discrimination Act.

The purpose of the State

Engineer in S & G, Inc. v. Morgan, supra is to change the point of
diversion of a water

right.

Because these Commissions have

purposes substantially different from the purposes of the licensing
agencies, these decisions are not directly applicable to the issue
before the court in this case.

This court should instead rely on

Heinecke v. Dept of Commerce, supra to determine whether by statute
the Plaintiff is irrevocably foreclosed from de novo review in the
district court of Driver License Division's Administrative action
to suspend his driver license since he did not request a hearing
before the driver license hearing officer.
The statutes governing Motor Vehicles provides "A person
denied a license or whose license has been cancelled, suspended or
revoked

by

the

division

may

seek

judicial

review

of

the

department's order." Section 53-3-224 Utah Code Ann. "The district
courts shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final
agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings[. ]"
Section 63-46b-15 Utah Code Ann. No statute requires Defendant to
6

request a hearing before DLS or suffer loss of right for de novo
review under Section 53-3-224 or Section 63-46b-15 Utah Code Ann.
The letter (Exhibit B) from the Department of Public Safety
informing the defendant that his driving privilege was suspended
pursuant to agency action also informs the defendant of his right
to appeal the agency's action: "Unless you have failed to appear
for the hearing, you may appeal this action in the District Court
in the County of your residence within thirty days."

The plain

language of this letter denies an appeal only to those who have
"failed

to appear

for

the

hearing."

It makes

no statement,

warning, or admonition to the person who simply does not request
a hearing in the first place.

Thus, there is no obligation to the

licensee to either request or attend a hearing to avail himself of
the judicial review of the original and final agency action under
Section 53-3-224 Utah Code Ann.
Judicial

review under Title 41

is a trial c[e novo in the

district court. Section 41-6-44.10, Utah Code Ann.

This provision

when viewed with Section 63-46b-14 Utah Code Ann. which provides
for judicial

review except when a statute expressly

prohibits

review, compels the conclusion that it is not necessary to take any
Administrative steps to protect the right of an action to reinstate
a driving privilege suspended or revoked by the department, when
that

is a final

order.

Defendant submits that the

procedure

involved in taking the his driving privilege is an informal one
under the Administrative Code.

Both the Administrative Code and

Sections 53-3-224 and 41-6-44.10 Utah Code Ann. authorize direct

7

appeal by way of Petition to the district court.
The DLS held some form of determinative process in connection
with the Plaintiff's driving privilege and ruled against him.

The

Plaintiff, relied on the plain language of the citation issued to
him at the time of his arrest:

"FAILURE TO REQUEST A HEARING OR

FAILURE TO APPEAR FOR HEARING may result in loss of your driving
privilege." (Exhibit A) and though choosing not to participate in
the hearing, waited to see what action the agency would take. When
the agency suspended his license, Plaintiff relied on the plain
language of the suspension letter which stated: "Unless you have
failed to appear for the hearing, you may appeal this action in the
District Court in the County of your residence within thirty days."
Based on the

information

person

not conclude

would

given to the Plaintiff, a reasonable
failure

to

request

a hearing

would

prohibit review of a decision resulting from that hearing.

If an

individual were required to request a hearing, attend a hearing or
be precluded

from judicial

review of the agency's decision to

suspend his license, the word "shall" would be used in place of the
word "may."
In

Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman. 790 P.2d 587 (Utah App. 1990),

this court discussed the protection against prejudice afforded to
a licensee at the informal DLS hearings because of the licensee's
"absolute right to a trial de novo before the district court."
Brinkerhoff,

this court

held

that

the

"trial

de

novo

In

in the

district court provided by the UAPA eliminated any prejudice to the
defendant [by error in the proceedings below.]"
8

The Defendant's

Memorandum

in

Support

of

Summary

Affirmance

supports

this

conclusion by stating, "[r]eview of the administrative suspension
of his driving privileges is governed by the UAPA". Section 63-46b1, et sea. Utah Code Ann.

Accordingly, Appellant is entitled to

a trial de novo in the district court.
CONCLUSION
The argument of the Defendant that Plaintiff has failed to
exhaust administrative remedies is misplaced according to the
governing statutes and case law of this matter.

Therefore,

Plaintiff is entitled to a trial de novo in the district court and
this Court should reverse and remand this matter for hearing.

DATED this

H* day ofOClA'

*ANKLIN A
Attorney for
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
at p. true and correct eopy of the
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that
foregoing Brief of Appellant, Daniel Nixon, was hand-delivered or
mailed postage prepaid, this

4

/ day of January 1994, to:
JAN GRAHAM, #1231
Attorney General
THOM ROBERTS #2773
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents
236 State Capitol

A D D E N D U M

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DANIEL J. NIXON,
Plaintiff,
CASE NUMBER: 930400059
vs.
G. BARTON BLACKSTOCK,
Bureau Chief,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Defendant.

The Court has received plaintiff's opposing memorandum and request for oral
argument on defendant's Motion to Dismiss. However, the memorandum and request are
untimely under Rule 4-501 C.J.A. in that they were filed more than 10 days after the filing
of defendant's motion. Hence, the Court will not grant oral argument in this case.
However, for purposes of making its ruling on the motion, the Court has fully considered
plaintiff's opposing memorandum, in addition to defendant's memorandum and supporting
affidavit. After such consideration, the Court finds plaintiffs defense to the motion, and the
plaintiffs action itself, to be frivolous.
Plaintiff admits that he did not request a hearing, even though he received notice on

the citation itself that he was entitled to a hearing concerning the revocation of his driver's
license before the Drivers License Division. The hearing offered by the division clearly
constitutes an administrative remedy. It is well settled law that as a general rule an
individual is not entitled to judicial review of the actions of administrative agencies unless
and until the individual has exhausted all administrative remedies. Utah Code Ann. § 6346b-14 (1989). See also State Tax Commission v. Iverson. 782 P. 2d 519, 524 (Utah 1989).
Plaintiff has failed to allege or establish in this case any valid exception to the general rule
noted above.
Because plaintiff failed to avail himself of the hearing offered to him by the Driver's
License Division, the Court must conclude that he has not exhausted all administrative
remedies as is required before invoking the jurisdiction of this Court. Accordingly, this case
is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
Counsel for defendant is to prepare an order of dismissal within 15 days of this
decision consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for
approval as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum
decision has no effect until such order is signed by the Court.
Dated this 21st day of April, 1993.

cc:

J. Franklin Allred, Esq.
Thorn D. Roberts, Assistant Attorney General

JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
THOM ROBERTS (2773)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1016
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DANIEL J. NIXON,
Plaintiff,
vs.

*
*
*
*
*

ORDER OF DISMISSAL BASED UPON
FAILURE TO EXHAUST
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

*

G. BARTON RLACKSTOCK, Bureau
Chief,

*
*
*

Civil No. 930400059
Judge Harding

Defendant.
The above-entitled matter having been submitted to the
Court on Defendant's Motion for Dismissal for Failure to Exhaust
Administrative Remedies, and the Court having reviewed the Motion
to Dismiss for Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies, the
affidavits filed in support thereof, and the Memorandum filed in
support thereof, and the Court having reviewed the Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to
Exhaust Administrative Remedies and the documents filed by

counsel for the Plaintiff, and the Court being fully advised in
the premises, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Plaintiff's
Complaint shall be and is hereby dismissed and the Plaintiff
shall recover nothing thereby, based upon the Plaintiff's failure
to exhaust his administrative remedies.
DATED this

day of May,1993.
BY THE COURT:

RAY M. HARDING
District Judge
Approved as to form:

J. FRANKLIN ALLRED
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I mailed a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL BASED UPON
FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES to the following this
L5'C

day of May, 19 93:
J. Franklin Allred
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah

84102
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State of Utah

""'DEC 2 7 1992

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION
(', l l v . - v I'-;.. :.-.• •• i. !••;•.•• i i - i . „ . f
DATE OF ARREST: 02 DEC 1992
DATE OF BIRTH: 2<\ MAR ! V*'S
4b0' $0U'»' ? 00 W«s' ''(J ' ™.
D Douglas Uod'nro
LICENSE/FILE NUMBER: 819^683
PO Bo* 30060
DATE:
25 DEC 1992
0- aiU Johnson
1 S' "
« "Y- ' * 8*' M-0560
D*i>»{v Commissi:
(801)965^43/
THIS ORDER IS EFFECTIVE
12:01 AM ON 31 DEC 1992
DANIEL f NIXON
16 5 EAST CENTER
PLEASANT GROVE UT 8 4 0G2
fp Yt<J Cfic^i
6*yQ€&fsf-l
r: • •

•.

,

7

1

uv

C

u

h

AS A RESULT OF A SECOND OR SUBSEQUENT ARREST FOR DRIVING UNDER THE
INFLUENCE, YOUR DRIVING PRIVILEGE IS SUSPENDED FOR A PERIOD OF ONE YEAR
EFFECTIVE 31 DEC 1992.
(THE PA'iJS FOR SU'"!! AC!: OS* !S FINLMNOS OF FACT AND CONCLUSION W! THE
HKARINO OFFICER FOR Tiff:: DEPARTMENT THAT A PEACH OFFICER HA!) R F.ASONA; U; .!•:
GROUNDS TO BELIEVE THAT YOU WERE OPERATING OR IN PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A MOTOR
VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE IN VIOLATION OF, OR YOU FAILED TO REQUEST
A HEARING, OR YOU HAVE SET OR RESET THE HEARING AFTER THE 30TH DAY FROM THE
DATE OF THE ARREST OR YOU HAVE FAILED TO APPEAR FOR THE HEARING CONTRARY TO
IJCA 41-6-44, l/CA -11-2-130 AND UCA 63-46b-3
AND 63-46b-ll).
CREDIT WILL BE GIVEN FOR ANY TIME YOUR DRIVING PRIVILEGE; HAS ALREADY HE EN
WITHDRAWN AS A RESULT OF YOUR CONVICTION FOR THE SAME OFFENSE OF DR: VN'l
UNDLR THE INFLUENCE.
/

THIS ACTION IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS OF TITLE 41,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1"> rv3 . THIS NOTICE DOES NOT REPLACE ANY PRIOR NOTICE
ALREADY IN EFFECT. •
***IMPORTANT INFORMATION - PLEASE READ***
WHEN YOUR DRIVING PRIVILEGE HAS SEEN SUSPENDED YOU MUST DISCONTINUE DRIVING
AND DELIVER YOUR LICENSE TO THIS DEPARTMENT. YOU MAY NOT OPERATE A MOTOR
VEHICLE UNTIL YOUR DRIVING PRIVILEGE HAS BEEN REINSTATED. IT IS A
MISDEMEANOR TO OPERATE ANY MOTOR VEHICLE UPCN THE HIGHWAYS OF THIS STATE
WHILE YOUR DRIVING "RIVILIT-E IS SUSPENDED.

.3'

F YOU HAVE NOT VOLUN'.\R ! LY SURRENDERED ALL LICENSES AND PERMITS WITHIN
TWENTY (20) DAYS AND A PICKUP ORDER IS ISSUED FOR THESE ITEMS, AN
ADDITIONAL S25.00 FEE WILL BE ASSESSED AT THE TIME OF REINSTATEMENT.

i
^{
j \ ^ \
' ^^
^
>Ao^'
'* W

UNLESS YOU FAILED TO APPEAR FOR THE HEARING, YOU MAY APPEAL THIS ACTION IN
THE DISTRICT COURT IN THE COUNTY OF YOUR RESIDENCE WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS.
TO REINSTATE YOUR DRIVING PRIVILEGE:
!F THIS IS YOUR SECOND OR SUBSEQUENT ALCOHOL OFFENSE, YOU MUST PROVIDE
PROOF OF COMPLETION OF A STATE APPROVED ALCOHOL REHABILITATION COURSE,

c x V* PAY A S75.00 REINSTATEMENT FEE. MAKE A CHECK OR MONEY ORDER PAYABLE TO:
5 ''iL^TAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY. PLEASE INDICATE YOUR DIVER LICENSE
. QY* NUMBER ON THE CHECK A\'D MAIL TO "HE ALOVE ADDRESS.

r

f

*f$G9B/^ DLPEGGYJ

0, BARTON BLACKSTOCK, BUREAU CHIEF
DRIVER LICENSE DIVISION

MOTOR VEHICLES
lid before the person's driving privilege
Aitated, to cover administrative costs. This
All be canceled if the person obtains an untied Driver License Division hearing or
.decision that the suspension was not
A'person whose operator license has been
t suspended, or postponed by the Driver
M Division under this section may file a
on within 30 days after the suspension for a
agon the matter which, if held, is governed
rtion 63-3-224.
ir reinstatement of an operator license for a
M under this section, a report authorized
ftion 63*3*104 may not contain evidence of
1 or suspension of the person's operator liler this section if he has not been convicted
wr offense for which the denial or suspenbe extended.
e provisions of Sections 41-12a*411 and
2 do not apply to a denial or suspension
br a first offense under this section if the
suspension is based solely on a violation of
B (2Xa).
In addition to the penalties in Subsection
person who violates Subsection (2)(a) shall
ferred by the Driver License Division to the
substance abuse authority for an assesse d recommendation for appropriate ac-

41-6-44.10
(B) The costs and fees under 8ubsee**
tion (A) shall be based on a sliding scale
consistent with the local substance
abuse authority's policies and practices
regarding fees for services.
less

41-6*44*5. Admissibility of chemical test results
in actions for driving under the influence — WeigLt of evidence.
(1) (a) In any civil or criminal action or proceeding
in *hich it is material to prove that a person was
operating or in actual physics! control of a vehicle while undar il.e influence of alcohol or drugs
or with a blood cr breath alec hoi content statutorily prohibited, the results cf a chemical test or
tests as authorized in Ezctici ^1-^1.10 aro aiuissiblo as evid.r.c:.
(b) In a crimir^l b j-oce: 1'. j , noncompliance
with Section 41-6-^.10 doeo not render the results of a chemical test inadmissible. Evidence of
a defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or
drug content is admissible except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution.
(2) If the chemical test was taken more than two
hours after the alleged driving or actual physical control, the test result is admissible as evidence of the
person's blood or breath alcohol level at the time of
the alleged operating or actual physical control, but
the trier of fact shall determine what weight is given)
to the result of the test.
(3) This section does not prevent a court from receiving otherwise admissible evidence as to a defendant's blood or breath alcohol level or drug level at
the time of the alleged operating or actual physical
control.
isss

(i) Reinstatement of the person's operator
icense or the right to obtain an operator li*
ense is contingent upon successful complejon of the action recommended by the local
tubstance abuse authority.
(li) The local substance abuse authority's 41-6-44A Municipal attorneys for specified oftcommended action shall be determined by
fenses may prosecute for certain DUI
in assessment of the person's alcohol abuse
offenses and driving while license susrod may include:
pended or revoked.
(A) a targeted education and proven%
The following class A misdemeanors may be prose* tion program;
cuted by attorneys of cities and towns, as well as by
(B) an early intervention program; or prosecutors authonzed elsewhere in this code to pros*
jku)
(C) a substance abuse treatment pro* ,cci:t3 theee alleged violations:
% r
gram.
. (1) alleged closa A misdemeanor \ bl.ti jns of
r
(iii) Successful completion of the recomSubsection 41-5-1 l(6XeXii); and
mended action shall be determined by stan-'
(2) alleged violations of Section 63*3-227,
lards established by the Division of Subwhich consist cf-the> person operating & vehicle
stance Abuse.
while his operator's license is suspended or reAt the conclusion of the penalty period im- *
voked for a violation of Section 41-6-44, a local
d under Subsection (2), the local substance
ordinance which complies with the requirements
e authority shall notify the Driver License
of Section 41-6-43, Section 41-6-44.10, Section
lion of the person's status regarding comple76-5-207, or a criminal prohibition that the perof the recommended action.
son was charged with violating as a result of a
) The local substance abuse authorities shall'
plea bargain after having been originally
erate wiifc the Driver License Division, im ( .r^;'charged with violating one or more cf those sec(i) conducting the assessments;
. r a t i o n s or ordinances^ .
isss
K
(ii) making appropriate recommendations *• "W
™ ^ '•yw no'^nwUu
tot action; and
<n 41-6-44.10. Implied consent to cheniical tests for*
' (iii) notifying the tMver License Division 1
alcohol or drug — Number of tests —
Refusal —• Warning, report — Hearing,
about the person's status regarding comple- i *^I(1 °
revocation of license — Appeal — Pertion of the recommended action.
> (i) The local substance abuse authority is ' •'•'1 [> • < son incapable of refusal — Results of
responsible for:
\« M r t o wt test available — Who may give test —
**
*
w»% (A) the coetW the'assessment^ the tftfqf b*ft* Evidence. '**«, *
KM0erson's alcohol abuse; and < "< ^#» J M ) ti)(}A person operating %'ttotot vehicle in this
mm* (B) for making a referral to Wappfo**Hpfc,stats is considered to have given his consent to 4
fef^priate program on the basis of the findtf^o 'chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, of
lvwn. ings of the assessment
^fcw urine for the purpose of determining whether he
h (ii) (A) The person who violated 8ubsec-** tiofc'was operating or in actual physical control of a
tov tion (2)(a) is responsible for all costs and ' f* () motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alftV fees associated with the recommended '• n v\ cohol content statutorily prohibited under Secfy^ program to which the person is referred.
• tion 41*6-41 cr tl-Z-liA> or while under the in-

fluence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of t }A\\ (e) (i) A person who has been notified oft
alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, if br'i (j ( ^k Driver License Division's intention to rev
the test is or tests are administered at the direc- -ju< iwtt his license underthissectipn is entitled I
tion of a peace officer having grounds to believe to . » ^ £ ^ a r i n g . , r * '.JJ,] -»evhCi W ^ f l j S j
that person to have been operating or in actual ^t^aaw (ii) A request for ^ e . hearingVihaO
physical control of a motor vehicle while having ~\ l ^ ' m a d e in writii* ^
a blood or" breath alcohol content statutorily pro- n TOdate of the arrest. ^ n ^ t A W W |
hibited under Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4, or '-./cjKjfV (iii) Upon written request, W d W o i
while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or ; , ,'fl w shall grant to the person an opportunity C
j
combination of alcohol and any drug under Sec- >'/V.o.< be heard within 29 days after the ' d m *
tion 41-6-44.
"
^.^^arrest
<
• W ^ |
(b) (i) The peace officer determines which of *7(- 'l '<' tty) If **** Person does not make a timely
the tests are administered and bpw many of & SitPtfi written request for a hearing before the divi^emawaoMnistenKl^^^
"f^'
^ W 1 ^ W 8 Privilege to operate a motor vehicle,
^ (ii) If an officer requests more than one >ttJa#j;(inthe state is revoked beginning on the 80tb.
lest, refusal by a person to take one or more ii "^V'day after the date of arrest for a period <
1
requested tests, even though he does submit
(A) one year unleaf8ub#ection(By|frj
to any other requested test or tests, is a replies; or
' ~
* ~ ^ j $ |
fusal under this section.
(B) 18 months if the person has hs^|
(c) (i) A person who has been requested under
previous license sanction after July 1,'j
this section to submit to a chemical test or
1993, under this section, Section]
tests of his breath, bjood, or urine, may not
41-2-130 or 41-6-44.4, or a conviction af-j
select the test or tests to be administered.
ter July 1,1993, under Section 41*6Mij
(f) If a hearing is requested by the personal
p y (ii) The failure or inability of a peace officer to arrange for any specific chemical test xto.j conducted by the Driver License Division/ thfj
is not a defense to taking a test requested by '";' hearing shall be documented an4 shall cover tf
a peace officer, and it is not a defence in any ' " ' i s s u e s of:
~ '« ' ^
*| ,«
criminal, civil, cr edrr.i *btrative proceeding
d.wb < (j) whether a peace officer had reasonable!
resulting from a person's refusal to submit to -ja j,n;i grounds to believe that a person was opertt-J
the requested test or t38ts.
. im> ing a motor vehicle in violation off
(£) (a) If the person has boon placed under arrest, ?$<fA 41^44; and
< '
^
ihas then been requested by a paace officer to sub- *", ^ W (ii) whether the person refused to i
; mty to any one or more of the chemical tests un- C ^ W V t o the test.
' * -VH
der Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to any m°l ^ig) (i) In connection with the hearjng, the<
chemical test requested, the person shall be
| ; vision or its authorized agent:
warned by the peace officer requesting the test or
(A) may administer oaths and i
vJI
<
tests that a refusal to submit to the test or tests
sue subpoenas for the attendance off
•ii
<
can result in revocation of the person's license to
nesses and the production of relev
operate a motor vehicle.
books and papers; and
-ttamq far
(B) shall issue subpoenas for tbel
(b) Following the warning under Subsection
tendance
of necessary peace officer*,!
(a), if the person does not immediately request
nfei
iMmw
ithat the chemical test or tests as offered by a •io
-oia
tabu Q® "*• ^vision * a U P«y witness fees I
4
peace officer be administered a peace officer shall y *r8\ mileage from the Transportation Fund itii
cordance with the rates established in
serve on the person, on behalf of the Driver License Division, immediate notice of the Driver •ffi»J«»
tion 21-5-4.
(h) If after a hearing, the Driver Llcensel
License Division's intention to revoke the per- ^ijr
son's privilege or license to operate a motor vehi- v sion determines that the person was requested {
cle. When the officer serves the immediate notice m submit to a chemical test or tests and refined |
on behalf of the Driver License Division, he shall: CM*U) submjtjo the test or tests, or if the person fUiij
(i) take the Utah license certificate or per- (W ': appear before the Driver License Division si f
^\x quired in the notice, the Driver License Diy
mit, if any, of the operator;
r
1
shall revoke his license or permit to opers^
' (ii) issue a temporary license effective for
\[n motor vehicle in Utah beginning on t£ej
only 29 days; and
(iii) supply to the operator, on a form ap- n , Rearing is held for a period of:
(i) (A) one year unless Subsectio
proved by the Driver License Division, basic
plies; or
information regarding how to obtain a hear(B) 18 months if the person hall
ing before the Drive.*, licenzo Division.
previous license sanction after Jul
(c) A c'tation issued by a peace officer may, if
approved as to form by tie Driver License Divi- r-alqmtn ^» . 1993, under this section, 8«
ision, serve also as the temporary license.
t 41-2-130 or 41-6-44.4, or a conviction^
\\ <d) The peace officer shall submit a signed re- al v^rji/J* ter July 1,1993, under Section 41-6(ii) The Driver License Division shallj
port, within five days after the date cf the arrest,
against the person, in addition t
that he had grounds to believe the arrested per- itdl f<<
fee imposed under Subsection 53-3-2 ~
son had been operating or was in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or -oiitcjM i fee under Section 53-3-105, which I
breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited un- •bmVjAi* P**d before the person's driving priv
"'' reinstated, to cover administrative <
der Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.4 or while under
the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination -^WV.::\' ( i i i ) T h e f e € 8 h a 1 1 ** excelled if t
of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44 hm<\*$?c\ eon obtains an unappealed court <
and that the person had refused to submit to a tebuftw lowing a proceeding allowed under t
jchemicai test or tests under Subsection (1).
Jtermt'y section that the revocation was im

m

MOTOR V E H I C L E S
^ H 0 f ( 0 Any person whose license has been re^HPVoked by the Driver License Division under
^Hftfthi* section may seek judicial review.
^ B r ' (ii) Judicial review of an informal ac-judi^WJ*cative proceeding is a trial. Venue is in the
^ • 1 ^ district court in the county in which the per*
HHw'son resides.
HMfAfiy person who is dead, unconscious, or in any
H r condition rendering him incapable of refusal to
Halt to any chemical test or tests is considered to
Kolfo withdrawn the consent provided for in SubHMB (1), and the test or tests may be administered
Htthet the person has been arrested or not.
M) Upon the request of the person who was tested,
prwulU of the test or tests shall be made available

film.

ItS) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practiVeal nurse, or person authorized under Section
R 26-1-30, acting at the request of a peace officer,
Wttay withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or
P'drug content. This limitation does not apply to
•'faking a urine or breath specimen.
KM (b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical
PVurae, or person authorized under Section
w 26-1-30 who, at the direction of a peace officer,
fc draws a sample of blood from any person whom a
tttoace officer has reason to believe is driving in
•^violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical
Ifftcility at which the sample is drawn, is immune
Plrom any civil or criminal liability arising from
r drawing the sample, if the test is administered
^according to standard medical practice.
H6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own exI pens*, have a physician of his own choice admins' iater a chemical test in addition to the test or
h teats administered at the direction of a peace offi-

41-6-44.30

tainer which contains any alcoholic beverage if the
container has been opened, its seal broken, or the
contents of the container partially consumed.
(3) In this section:
(a) "Alcoholic beverage" has the meaning
h
? f given in Section 32A-1-105.
(b) "Chartered bus" has the meaning given in
,,v8ection 32A-1-105.
',
(c) "Limousine" has the meaning given in Secr
\ tion 32A-1-105.
nm
^ "Passenger compartment" means the area
''|
of the vehicle normally occupied by the operator
' hm and passengers and includes areas accessible to
" n them while traveling, such as a utility or glove
'
compartment, but does not include a separate
front or rear trunk compartment or other area of
the vehicle not accessible to the operator or pas"' ' sengers while inside the vehicle.
;'(4) Subsections (I) and (2) do not apply to passen1
gers in the living quarters of a motor home or
camper.
V, (5) Subsection (2) does not apply to passengers
traveling in any licensed taxicab or bus.
(6) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to passengers who have carried their own alcoholic beverage
pnto a limousine or chartered bus that is in compliance with Subsections 32A-12-213(l)(b) and (c). isso

^41-6-44.30. Seizure and impoundment of vehicles by peace officers — Impound re*
^l^tjl
quiremente — Removal of vehicle by
ii iM^ * owner.
uA
X\Y(&) If a peace officer arrests or cites the operaK<
tor of a vehicle for violating Section 41-6-44 or
^-•'(- 41-6-44.10, or a local ordinance similar to Section
J [) 41-6-44 which complies with Subsection 41-6f
Vfcp 43(1), the officer shall seize and impound the ve<#hKhicle, except as provided under Subsection (2).
W (b) The failure or inability to obtain the addi- *b t , J (b) A vehicle seized and impounded under this
tional test does not affect admissibility of the re- Wrfp section shall be moved by a peace officer or by a
faults of the test or tests taken at the direction of a <*~stfftow truck that meets the standards established:
Ppeace officer, or preclude or delay theteet or testa
(i) by the department under Subsection
jp to be taken at the direction of a peace officer.
41-6-102(4)(b);
\& (C) The additional test shall be subsequent to
(ii) under Title 41, Chapter 6, Article 18,
^the teat or tests administered at the direction of a u
Tow Truck and Impound Regulation Act;
n,y
peace officer.
and
(7) For the purpose of determining whether to sub- nbMs
(iii) the Public Service Commission under
t to a chemical test or tests, the person to be tested
8ection
*ch
AV
54-6-42.5.
% not have the right to consult an attorney or have
1
iattorney, physician, or other person present as a' 4f. (2K If a registered owner of the vehicle , other than
c
the operator, is present at the time of arrest, the offijodition for the taking of any test. ' ,' \ * r
1
Jj8j) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a cer may release the vehicle to that registered owner,
* mical test or tests or any additional test under ^but only if the registered owner
(a) requests to remove the vekhle from tha
i section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in
vt
iy civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out 1" 'scene;
\
(b) presents to the officer a valid operator's lifacta alleged to have been committed while the peri[
il1 was operating or in actual physical control of a x"' ^ cense and sufficient identification to prove ownfrwor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, \\ ^ership of the vehicle;
^1< (c) complies with all restrictions of) his operanjrog, pr combination of alcohol and any drug.
!
*^
wm^iw^ . ;»ty
., tj ai/Tf
, Jo Jnom
.^. lU Ppal*^ nW s license; and the' judgment of the <officer,
be..'
( d ) w o u l d not> i n
1*44411* Repealed* fo oJ w ' imU'jAbJiifoq1' itai
hkh^in violation of Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.10, or a
. Drinking alcoholic beverage and /^ lJ local ordinance similar to Section 41-6-44 which
^ t open containers in motor vehicle pro- *' v complies with Subsection 41-6-43(1), if permitted
5
i' hibited — Definitions — Exceptions*
to operate the vehicle, and if the vehicle itself is
UH person may not drink any alcoholic beverage Y*p legally operable.
fiOperating a motor vehicle or while a passenger «>^3) (a) The peace officer or agency by whom the
motor vehicle, whether the vehicle is moving, ?£% 7 officer is employed shall, within 24 hours after
parked]on any highway.,, npdi* iU
HO&pjthe seizure, notify the Motor Vehicle Division of A
lA person may not keep, carry, possess^ trans- VWjWthc .seizure and impoundment.«, i>0\3i&crf4Hi ^
sor allow another to keep, carry, possess, or ^ 4 , V ,Cb) Th« ao^ce shall state: ,IOT<« *j vtfsfiewtl'*
rt in the passenger compartment of a motor *m \WA 1y (i) the operator's name;'»,r\f A V WWf
e, when the vehicle is on any highway, any con- jlnf vr ' (ii) a description of the vehicle; * v <»»1

l* * >

PUBLKfSXfrfifY
••moving from the highways those persons
i shown they are safety hazards.
lses

&&2&

(c) The hearing shall be documented and shall
cover the issues of:
(i) whether a peace officer had reasonable
Chemical test for driving under the in*
grounds to believe the person was driving a
fluence — Temporary license — Hear* 10 .1 / motor vehicle in violation of Section 41-6-44;
v ing and decision — Suspension and fee
(ii) whether the person refused to submit
- — Judicial review.
'«/a^ ; " 1to the test; and
If a peace officer has reasonable grounds to » b ' ' ^
(iii) the test results, if any. ,V«7.
ve that a person may be violating or has fcaaV(d)
/j>(i) In connection with a hearing the divitod Section 41-6-44, prohibiting the operasion or its authorized agent:
of a vehicle with a certain blood or breath
(A) may administer oaths and may isb«h' .
ioi concentration and driving under the insue
subpoenas for the attendance of witce of any drug, alcohol, or combination of a
nesses
and the production of relevant
it
and alcohol, the peace officer may, in conand papers;
on with arresting the person, request that sndfa<l'>" books
(B) may issue subpoenas for the aterson submit to a chemical test or tests to be
tendance
of necessary peace officers.
nistered in compliance with the standards MfftM!
011 8n
an rr *
*li) T h e d*^**
*H P* y witness fees and
r Section 41-6-44.10.
m
In this section, a reference to Section sbtfth r nwteag* fr° the Transportation Fund in accordance with the rates established in Sec44 includes any similar focal ordinance {l i
tion 2-15-4.
ted in compliance with Subsection
oi M (e) One or more memleis cf the division may
43(1).
f
l>t)ls conduct the hearing.
• peace officer shall advise a person prior to ^
(f) Any decision made after a hearing before
EI'S submission to a chemical test that a test . j>f, any
number of the members of the division is as
8
licating a violation of Section 41-6-44 shall, TO ^ valid
as if made after a hairing lafore the full
ristence of a blood alcohol content sufficient Q \ membership
of the division.
,< 0
(U
the person incapable of safely driving a mon
(g)
After
the
hearing,
the
division
shall
order
e may, result in suspension or revocation of rmtr whether the person's license to drive a motor ven's license to drive a motor vehicle.
" 0 hide is suspended or not.
ie person submits to a chemical test and the M«*
(h) If the person for whom the hearing is held
ts indicate a blood or breath alcohol content ofttf 'fails
to appear before the division as required in
m of Section 41-6-44, or if the officer makes
notice, the diviaion shall order whether the
nation, based on reasonable grounds, that Us^'the
s
m is otherwise in violation of Section — 0 person's license to drive a motor vehicle is sushsici
pended or not.
he officer directing administration of the
1
iking the determination shall serve on the ^ ( 7 ) (a) A first suspension, whether ordered or hot
^
'
challenged
under
this
subsection,
is
for
a
period
i behalf of the division, immediate notice of lf
on's intention to suspend the person's l u - < ror of 90 days, beginning on the 30th day after the
' *' date of the arrest.
Irive a motor vehicle. <
(b) A second or subsequent suspension under
When the officer serves immediate notice , n
°'
this
subsection is for a period of one year, beginhalf of the division he shall:
10
(i) take the Utah license certificate or per? } ning on the 30th day after the date of arrest.
lit, if any, of the driver,
> > ) ^ ' (8) (a) The division shall assess against a person,
(ii) issue a temporary license certificate :>' K, in addition to any fee imposed under Subsection
^ 63-3-206(14) for driving under the influence, a
ffective for only 29 days; and
(iii) supply to the driver, on a form to be " ..1 fee under Section 53-3-106 to cover administrative costs, which shall be paid before the person's
pproved by the division, basic information
Bgarding how to obtain a prompt hearing ^ , driving privilege is reinstated. This fee shall be
cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed diefore the division.
fy,, vision hearing or court decision that the suspenA citation issued by the officer may, if api as to form by the division, serve also as jn^fsion was not proper.
n i | v , (b) A pen:., v.hece license has been suspended
imporary license certificate,
peace officer serving the notice shall send ^ by the divicion under this subsection may file^
ision within five days after the date of ar- j,,,, petition within 30 days after the suspension for, %
1 ^ Rearing on the matter which, if held, is governed
lervice of the notice:
4 ( . o t s>
1
fl0,>by Section 63-3-224.
di, 1h
the person's license certificate; ' ,y" >''®
a copy of the citation issued for the offense; 68-8-224. Filing a petition for hearing — Judia signed report on a form approved by the
cial review of license cancellation, reon indicating the chemical test results, it
be-ff'Jpoi vocation, or suspension — Scope of re-,
any other basis for tne officers detennin*:* "•
person denied a license or whose license ha#>
bat the person has violated Section 41-6-44. V
Upon written request, the division shall been cancelled, suspended, or revoked by the division 1
to the person an opportunity to be heard may seek judicial review of the division's o r d e r s
129 days after the date of arrest. The re- j(2) (a) Venueforjudicial review of informal a4juJo be heard shall be made within ten days &$**• dicative proceedings is in the district court in the
»<tu county where the person resides.
i date of the arrest.
,} , ,
, '
A hearing, if held, shall be before the divi- io •» > (b) Persons not residing in the state shall filei
a the county in which the arrest occurred,' &h'in Salt Lake County or the county where the ofi the division and the person agree that the > eftjfense occurred, which resulted in the cancella-*
ig may be held in some other county, ^a .boition, suspension, or revocation. «*A* iJ H^iesi*
'$}

STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL
i(iv) be sent by mail to the presiding officer
to each party,
thin 15 days of the mailing date of the refer review, or within the time period provided
rule, whichever is longer, any party may
response with the person designated by statute
to receive the response. One copy of the reshall be sent by mail to each of the parties and
presiding officer.
|),If a statute or the agency's rules require review
order by the agency or a superior agency, the
JOT superior agency shall review the order
a reasonable time or within the time required
statute or the agency's rules.
To assist in review, the agency or superior
may by order or rule permit the parties to file
or other papers, or to conduct oral argument.
i) Notice of hearings on review shall be mailed to
parties.
m (a) Within a reasonable time after the filing of
•toy response, other filings, or oral argument, or
•Within the time required by statute or applicable
Irules, the agency or superior agency shall issue ar
•written order on review.
p (b) The order on review shall be signed by the"
fyency head or by a person designated by the
agency for that purpose and shall be mailed to
party.
U)
£(c) The order on review shall contain:
k (i) a designation of the statute or rule per-f
Wnitting or requiring review;
^huK (ii) a statement of the issues reviewed^
(iii) findings of fact as to each of the issues{
^reviewed;
1,1
(iv) conclusions of law as to each of thef
^issues reviewed;
^ ,
>ij
* 0 (v) the reasons for the disposition; ' "
(vi) whether the decision of the presiding
officer or agency is to be affirmed, reversed,
h or modified, and whether all or any portion
'K of the adjudicative proceeding is to be re*
manded;
t
(vii)
a
notice
of
any
right
of
farther
adH*'( ministrative reconsideration or judicial re*
review available to aggrieved parties; and
J
(viii) the time limits applicable to any apl peal or review.
isss
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63-46b~14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of ad*
ministrative remedies.
iv (1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of
final agency action, except in actions where judicial
review is expressly prohibited by statute.
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after e*2
hausting all administrative remedies available, except that:
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not
^
^
exhaust
administrative remedies if this chapter
1
"' s or any other statute states that exhaustion is not
™
required;
,
.
, x >
Ur
*
(b)
the
court
may'relieved
paAysoekingjuii?
*r<w cial review of the requirement to exhaust any or
all administrative remedies if:
on
(i) the administrative remedies are inade-b>
quate; or
V »
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in
irreparable harm disproportionate to the
public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion,
i ;
*
*r'(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within 30 days after
0| ij the date that the order constituting the final
„n agency action is issued or is considered to have
T', been l»ued under Subsection 63-46b-13(3)(b). >
(b) [The petition shall name the agency and all
Y0/v other appropriate parties as respondents and
6r{) shall meet the form requirements specified in
this chapter.
isss
<(l
>w

6&^6b-15. Judicial review —^Informal adtjudf*
. ,.
cative proceedings.
1( j(l) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to
review by trial de novo all final agency actions
r resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings, except that the juvenile court shall have
u u jurisdiction over all state agency actions relating
& j to removal or placement decisions regarding chik
VJfrdren in state custody.
. >$.
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal acJjuV
no dicative proceedings shall be as provided in the
-L-T statute governing the agency or, in the absence
otn of such a venue provision, in the county where
UW>the petitioner resides or maintains his principal
place of business.
<* (2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal
adjudicative proceedings shall be a complaint
fcb-l& " Agency review — Reconsideration*
:
) (a) Within 20 days after the date that an order 1® governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
}
and shall include:
js issued for which review by the agency or by a
' (i) the name afid mailing address of the
superior agency under Section 63-46b-12 is un- ;";-i
available, and if the order would otherwise con- P 4iM jjarty seeking judicial review;
stitute final agency action, any party may file a 9#I0V v (ii) the name and mailing addrW 6f the
J respondent agency;
imtten request for reconsideration with the
tf*w , ( i i i ) t h e t i t l e a n d d a t e o f ^ final a g e n c v
agency, stating the specific grounds upon which
relief is requested. ,
,
.
} x
<( action to be reviewed, together with a dupli.(b) Unless otherwise provided by statute, the
Yones* ^ ^ copy* summary or, brief description of
Uing of the request is not a prerequisite for seekng judicial review of the order.
,,i><u v
parties in the informal adjudicative proceedThe request for reconsideration shall be filed
ings that led to the agency action; ,;
the agency and one copy shall be sent by mail to \ (
oi Wtfr< (y) A copy ofthe written agency order,from
party by the person making the request u
,i, ,
(a) The agency head, or a person designated for
lfri the informal proceeding; , V)C
<yV<^(vi) facts demonstrating that the party
hat purpose, shall issue a written order granting
tie request or denying the request
i
-OP. i^i seeking
judicial review is entitled to obtain
u
i(b) If the agency head or the person designated ; r « i 8 i t 0 r J ^ ^ X^viewh^mafilMi iliw «t>tb «u*-**
w that purpose does not issue an order within 20 Hnetort &J<vii),a*request forr^jrelief^.specifying,^
ays after the filing of the request, the request *ni f * t y p e and, extent of relief requested; .. to
(7) Uk. (viii) a statement otthe reasons whyrtto
ir reconsideration* shall be considered
to be de»
led. i
, to^ (*<j)m-•>N *i»H.
isss WBiiosj; petitioner is entitled to relief, uu >u^i A

